Some researchers suggest that managers use complex and lengthy disclosure, some investors and stakeholders use the information that keep secret the bad news or the bad performance of the company simply is not specified in the reports. In other words, when manager Proceed to earnings management, they try to provide reports with less readability so that it is difficult to determine their behavior in earnings management. This paper examines the impact of real earnings management on financial reporting readability. In this regard, for measuring readability of two Flesch-Dayani and the Document-Length index, and for measuring real earnings management, three abnormal levels of operational cash flow, production and discretionary expenses have been used. The research hypotheses were tested by using a sample of 57 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange between 2005 and 2016 using a multivariate regression model based on the panel data technique. The focus of this research is on the readability of the board's activity report. The results of this research show that real earnings management has a significant effect on the financial reporting readability of companies, which means that companies publish their annual reports in that year with less readability in each fiscal year that they are managing profits.

In this study, using a sample consisting of 2702 firm-year observations of firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange, which their data were obtained for a period of 11 years from 1382 to 1392, we investigate whether firms with small pre-managed negative earnings, manage their income through real earnings manipulation to avoid losses or not. The implication of behavioral studies suggests zero earnings threshold might function as an important psychological reference for which managers have strong incentive to beat or exceed it and they are likely to engage in activities like offering customers price discounts to temporally increase sales, overproduction to lower cost of goods sold and decreasing discretionary expenditures to improve earnings reported to stakeholders. Our initial findings documented a significant discontinuity and irregularity in the pooled cross-sectional empirical distributions of earnings scaled by the total assets in intervals close to zero. Despite the evidence was consistent with earnings management explanation, other statistical findings did not provide evidence and support the prediction that managers boosted their income through activities like unusual sales discounts, overproduction, and cutting discretionary expenses to meet the earnings threshold.

The aim of this study is investigation into the effect of financial statements comparability on real earnings management in the listed companies on Tehran Stock Exchange. Required data were collected from the financial statements of 80 firms during 1390-1394. To examine the hypotheses, we used multivariate regression with pooled data. Comparability of financial statements is calculated based on Di Franco et al. (2011). Real earnings management is calculated based on developed model by De chow et al (1998) and Chowdhury (2006). The results revealed that there is positive and significant relationship between financial statements comparability and real earnings management criteria (unusual operating cash flow, abnormal production costs and optional extraordinary costs). In other words, with increasing the comparability of financial statements, managers' tendency to real earnings management would be increased to present a desirable of their current performance by manipulating real activities such as overproduction and abnormal increase in sales volume.

In different definitions on the concept of earnings management, it is focused on the issue that the earnings management is done to mislead the stock market. However, this question has not been answered that: is the capital market capable to detect the different strategies of earnings management? In this research, after measuring the real and accounting (accruals based) earnings management criteria in industry leve, to appraise the capital market's ability to detect the real earnings management and accounting earnings management, this paper uses the non-linear simultaneous equations and Mishkin (1989) test with panel data for 117 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2002 - 2015. The results show that the Tehran Stock Exchange is capable to detect accounting and real earnings management through manipulation of discretionary expenditure. However, the research results indicate that the capital market can not detect the real earnings management trought manipulation of sales, production and assets sales in mentioned period and managers mislead the capital market by adopting the policy of real earnings management trough mentioned approach.

Earning managements means general intervention of management in the process of determining earnings, which is often in line with desired objectives of the management. In the accounting literature, the most common methods for earnings management are accrual-based earnings management and real activities earnings management. This study examines the effectiveness of a firm's geographic dispersion on choosing between the two kinds of earning management, as the real activities earnings management and the accrual-based earnings management, to be followed. This research is an empirical fundamental in terms of objective and a correlation in terms of nature. The statistical population consists of firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange in the period from 1386 to 1394. The sample consists of 105 firms from different industries and the sampling method is systematic elimination, libraries and documentation. This study has two hypotheses which are tested using multivariate regression and T-test models. The results show that geographically dispersed firms have a lower level of accrual-based earnings management as well as real activities earnings management, as compared to the other firms.

This study aims to investigate the effect of CEO power on accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management of listed companies in the Tehran Stock Exchange. These three dimensions of real earnings management in our tests are abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production costs, and abnormal cash flow from operations. For this purpose, data related to 108 companies from 2010 to 2020 were analyzed. The regression model of the research has been examined and tested using the panel data approach and panel data with a fixed-effects approach. The results showed that CEO power has a significant negative impact on accrual-based earnings management. Also, the results showed that the concentration of CEO power has a significant negative impact on real earnings management (abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production cost, and abnormal cash flows from operations). Therefore, the research results indicate that powerful executives have more independence and more supervisory roles on the board which reduces the disadvantages of stakeholder rights and reduces the agency costs. Reducing agency costs reduce information asymmetry and reduce opacity in finances and thus indicates earnings management.

The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of Economic Uncertainty on Accrual Based Earnings Management and Real Earnings Management(Abnormal real operations) of listed Companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. These three dimensions of Real Earnings Management in our tests: abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production cost and abnormal cash flows from operations and also These Four dimensions of Economic Uncertainty in our tests: GDP growth, inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rates. Using ARCH and GARCH For this purpose four hypotheses are developed and data on the 142 companies in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period of 1386 to 1395 were analyzed. This regression model using panel data with fixed effects approach and Random, reviews and tests. The results showed that the concentration of Economic Uncertainty(GDP growth, inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rate) has significant positive impact on Accrual Based Earnings Management. Moreover, the results showed that the concentration of Economic Uncertainty(GDP growth, inflation rate, exchange rate and interest rate) has significant positive impact on Real Earnings Management(abnormal discretionary expenses, abnormal production cost and abnormal cash flows from operations).

This study is aimed to investigate the effect of different levels of financial leverage on real earnings management. In this study 125 firms in 2 different groups of high financial leverage and low financial leverage have been studied during 2004-2013. The real earnings management criteria include Abnormal operating cash flow, abnormal production costs and abnormal discretionary expenses. To investigate the effect of financial leverage on the real earnings management criteria, multivariate regression analysis using the panel data has been applied. The results show that in firms with high levels of financial leverage, the financial leverage has significant negative effect on each real earnings management criteria and also on sum of the real earnings management criteria. On the other hand, in firms with low levels of financial leverage, except when the real earnings management criteria is abnormal operating cash flow, financial leverage has significant negative effect on each real earnings management criteria and also on sum of the real earnings management criteria.

Investors and other users can use the company's earnings correctly for investment decisions and forecast cash flows and future earnings when the company's earnings are based on the actual financial performance of the company and not on the management's opinion in using the accounting methods. Accounting standards allow managers to have a wide range of options in selecting different accounting methods to calculate earnings, although managers may not use all of these options to achieve the company's goals. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to investigate real earnings management on the threshold of sensitive earnings and using the data of 148 companies as a research sample in the period between 1391 to 1398 has been done. The results showed that in companies suspected of earnings management on the verge of zero earnings, abnormal operating cash flows and abnormal discretionary costs are significantly lower than other companies and in companies suspected of earnings management on the verge of zero earnings, costs Abnormal production is significantly higher than other companies. Abnormally operating cash flows and abnormal discretionary expenses are significantly lower in companies suspected of earnings management on the expected earnings threshold.

This research is aimed to answer the fundamental question whether there is a significant relationship between return of discretionary reduction of general, sale, and administrative expenditures and reduction of the future performance. The question is presented as two hypotheses. Earnings management is measured using the benchmark for reducing of general, sale and administrative expenditures. The Statistical population of the research includes all firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. The sample consists of 114 listed firms during the period from 2011 to2016. Panel data analysis method, multivariate linear regression and Eviews9 software are used to test hypotheses and estimate coefficients. The results indicate that there is no significant relation between the return of discretionary reduction of general, sale and administrative expenses, and the reduction of future performance. But there is a significant relationship between the return of discretionary reduction in sales, general and administrative expenses, and the company limitation in earnings management of accruals.